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THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT—IN THE 
WORDS OF BIRCH BAYH, ITS PRINCIPAL 
AUTHOR 
John D. Feerick* 
INTRODUCTION 
Senator Birch Bayh of Indiana began the first of his three terms in the U.S. 
Senate on January 3, 1963.1  Less than a year later, the Senate Subcommittee 
on Constitutional Amendments, of which he was the new chairman following 
the death of Senator Estes Kefauver,2 had the opportunity to continue to find 
a solution to the problem of presidential inability.  As Senator Kenneth 
Keating of New York, a subcommittee member at the time, said, “As 
distasteful as it is to entertain the thought, a matter of inches spelled the 
difference between the painless death of John F. Kennedy and the possibility 
of his permanent incapacity to exercise the duties of the highest office of the 
land.”3  Keating added: 
The death of Estes Kefauver and John F. Kennedy provides a dual lesson 
for us.  First, it is a grim reminder of the universality of tragedy, that no 
man, no matter his station, is immune from the accidents of fate that befall 
ordinary mortals.  
Secondly, however, it cautions those who survive of the difficulty of 
clearly foreseeing the absolutely incredible.  Human legislation partakes 
always of human fallibility.  No act of lawmaking, no matter how carefully 
conceived and executed, can possibly safeguard against all the freak 
 
*  Dean Emeritus, Sidney C. Norris Chair of Law in Public Service, and Founder and Senior 
Counsel, Feerick Center for Social Justice, Fordham University School of Law.  A Symposium 
entitled Celebrating the Impact of Senator Birch Bayh:  A Lasting Legacy on the Constitution 
and Beyond, hosted by Fordham Law School’s Feerick Center for Social Justice, was held on 
October 16, 2019, at Fordham University School of Law.  This piece was prepared as part of 
a corresponding Tribute honoring the life of Senator Birch Bayh.  For an overview of this 
Tribute, see Foreword:  Celebrating the Impact of Senator Birch Bayh:  A Lasting Legacy on 
the Constitution and Beyond, 89 FORDHAM L. REV 1 (2020).   
 
 1. Bayh, Birch Evans, BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE U.S. CONG., 
https://bioguideretro.congress.gov/Home/MemberDetails?memIndex=B000254 [https:// 
perma.cc/9E4R-LULT] (last visited June 22, 2020). 
 2. See JOHN D. FEERICK, THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT:  ITS COMPLETE HISTORY AND 
APPLICATION 55–56 (3d ed. 2014). 
 3. Presidential Inability and Vacancies in the Office of Vice President:  Hearings on S.J. 
Res. 13 et al. Before the Subcomm. on Const. Amends. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th 
Cong. 22 (1964) [hereinafter 1964 Senate Hearings] (statement of Sen. Kenneth B. Keating, 
Member, S. Subcomm. on Const. Amends.). 
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contingencies of our existence.  The best we can hope to achieve is the best 
practical solution . . . .4 
Keating and Kefauver had formulated a proposed amendment to address 
the problem of presidential inability before President John F. Kennedy’s 
death.  Advocating for this proposal, Keating stated: 
Senator Kefauver and I . . . agreed that if anything was going to be done, 
all of the detailed procedures which had been productive of delay and 
controversy had best be scrapped for the time being in favor of merely 
authorizing Congress in a constitutional amendment to deal with particular 
methods by ordinary legislation.  This, we agreed, would later allow 
Congress to pick and choose the best from among all the proposals without 
suffering the handicap of having to rally a two-thirds majority in each 
House to do it.5 
Picking up the reins of leadership in a country devastated by the death of 
a young president, Senator Bayh, with the help of his small staff, developed 
a proposed constitutional amendment that borrowed from the work of his 
predecessors and reflected his own views as a graduate of Indiana University 
Maurer School of Law, where his favorite subject was constitutional law.6  
The amendment, Senate Joint Resolution 139 (“S.J. Res. 139”), contained 
provisions on presidential inability, filling a vacancy in the vice presidency, 
and providing for a cabinet line of succession beyond the vice presidency.7  
In January 1964, hearings of Bayh’s subcommittee began with a focus on S.J. 
Res. 139 and other proposals before the committee.8  By May 1964, the 
subcommittee had completed its work and recommended S.J. Res. 139, with 
revisions, to the full Senate Committee on the Judiciary.9  The new version 
removed from the proposal any mention of the line of succession beyond the 
vice presidency and incorporated recommendations from a task force of the 
American Bar Association.10  On August 4, the Senate Committee on the 
Judiciary approved the proposed amendment for floor consideration with an 
accompanying report explaining it.11 
On September 28, 1964, the Senate approved the proposed amendment by 
a voice vote.12  On the following day, the Senate again approved S.J. Res. 
139 by a roll call vote of 65 to 0.13  The Senate discussions dealt largely with 
the method for filling a vacancy in the vice presidency without any 
significant disagreement with respect to the procedures for handling a 
 
 4. Id. 
 5. S. REP. NO. 88-1382, at 18 (1964). 
 6. Interview, A Modern Father of Our Constitution:  An Interview with Former Senator 
Birch Bayh, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 781, 787 (2010). 
 7. See FEERICK, supra note 2, at 71–74. 
 8. See id. at 57. 
 9. See id. at 71. 
 10. See JOHN D. FEERICK, FROM FAILING HANDS:  THE STORY OF PRESIDENTIAL 
SUCCESSION 244–54 (1965). 
 11. FEERICK, supra note 2, at 75. 
 12. See id. at 76–78. 
 13. Id. at 78. 
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presidential inability.14  As to filling a vacancy in the vice presidency, Bayh 
said that the selection of the president’s choice would lead to a more peaceful 
transition, adding:  “What better opportunity is there for the people to express 
their wishes than through those who serve in Congress?”15 
Introduced as Senate Joint Resolution 1 (“S.J. Res. 1”) in January 1965, 
the proposed amendment was approved by the Senate, again with some 
revisions, on February 19, 1965, by a vote of 72 to 0.16  On April 13, 1965, 
the House of Representatives approved its version of S.J. Res. 1 by a vote of 
368 to 29 but with considerably more detail than the Senate version.17  A 
conference committee of six members from each chamber of Congress was 
established, with Senator Bayh serving as its chair.18  The committee, after 
almost two months of discussion, presented a unanimous report.19  It was 
adopted by the House of Representatives on June 30 by a voice vote.20  The 
Senate, some members of which had language concerns with the conference 
committee report, required two days for consideration of the report—June 30 
and July 6, 1965.21  The Senate then approved the amendment by a vote of 
68 to 5 and sent it to the states for ratification.22  By February 1967, it 
obtained approval from three-fourths of the states, and President Lyndon B. 
Johnson proclaimed the amendment as part of the Constitution on February 
23, 1967.23 
Throughout the amendment’s evolution from 1963 to 1965, Senator Bayh 
led the way as its principal author and chairman of the Senate Subcommittee 
on Constitutional Amendments.  He secured, by the force of his personality 
and advocacy, widespread support from members of both political parties in 
both chambers of Congress and also from the organized bar of every state 
and the District of Columbia.  When first filing his proposal on December 
12, 1963, he spoke passionately of the need to deal with succession to the 
offices of the president and vice president and handling cases where the 
president is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office.  He 
declared that:  “If we do not act in this time of sober and reasoned reflection, 
when shall we act?  When will we be as close to the issue as we are today?  
 
 14. See id. at 75–78. 
 15. 110 CONG. REC. 22,996 (1964) (statement of Sen. Birch Bayh).  In opening the Senate 
hearings of 1964, Senator Bayh said of the use of the Electoral College in filling a vacancy 
that the “electoral college is not chosen, as is Congress, to exercise any considered judgment 
or reasoning,” that it “is not equipped . . . to conduct hearings on the qualifications of the 
nominee submitted by the President” for the vice presidency, that “[i]t would be a cumbersome 
body to try to assemble quickly,” and that the people would hesitate to have electors unknown 
to them decide on the confirmation of a vice president. See 1964 Senate Hearings, supra note 
3, at 5 (statement of Sen. Birch Bayh, Chairman, S. Subcomm. on Const. Amends.). 
 16. See FEERICK, supra note 2, at 87–91. 
 17. See id. at 95, 100. 
 18. See BIRCH BAYH, ONE HEARTBEAT AWAY:  PRESIDENTIAL DISABILITY AND 
SUCCESSION 280 (1968). 
 19. See FEERICK, supra note 2, at 100. 
 20. See id. at 101. 
 21. See id. at 101, 103. 
 22. See id. at 104. 
 23. See id. at 105.  For a detailed account of this history, see id. at 56–107. 
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Hopefully, never.  But because history is unpredictable, we must provide for 
the unsought moments of national crises.”24 
As he advanced this constitutional reform, he made clear, in congressional 
debates, hearings, and committee reports, what the amendment intended.  
What follows is some of his thinking and reasoning as he created an 
important record of legislative history. 
I.  THE PATH THROUGH THE SENATE 
A.  December 12, 1963 
As the discussions about S.J. Res. 139 began, Senator Bayh offered his 
reasons in support of a constitutional amendment, stating: 
Many constitutional authorities have questioned the authority of 
Congress to deal with the subject of inability in a statute.  More important, 
both the questions of succession—which clearly can be dealt with in a 
statute—and inability are precisely the types of questions which should be 
incorporated in the Constitution, our basic charter of government.  Not only 
are they exactly the type of provision which one normally finds in a 
constitution, but also, once so enacted—and this is important—they are not 
subject to the political whims of a particular day.  These are problems which 
go to the very heart of our democratic form of government . . . .25 
Section 1, he said, contained the heart of his proposal, then in the form of 
S.J. Res. 139:  “It provides that the Vice President become President for the 
unexpired portion of the term of a President who dies, resigns, or is removed 
from office.  It eliminates the historical confusion as to whether the Vice 
President becomes President or Acting President.”26  He pointed to the 
succession of Vice President John Tyler, who became the new president in 
the face of many who felt he became only the acting president.  The Tyler 
precedent, Bayh said, became generally accepted despite the absence of any 
specific change in the Constitution.27  Section 1 codified that precedent.28 
Section 2 provided for refilling the office of vice president whenever the 
president dies, resigns, or is removed or if any of these contingencies occur 
regarding the vice president instead.29  Of the vice presidency, Bayh said, 
“[T]here have been a number of instances of succession to the Presidency on 
the part of the Vice President.  Each case has demonstrated the weakness of 
a system whereby there is no replacement of the Vice President,”30 adding 
that “[t]he accelerated pace of international affairs, plus the overwhelming 
problems of modern military security, make it almost imperative that we 
 
 24. 109 CONG. REC. 24,420 (1963). 
 25. Id. at 24,421. 
 26. Id. at 24,420. 
 27. Id. at 24,420–21. 
 28. See FEERICK, supra note 2, at 108. 
 29. See id. at 109. 
 30. 109 CONG. REC. 24,421. 
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change our system to provide for not only a President but a Vice President at 
all times.”31  Of the role of a vice president, he said: 
The modern concept of the Vice Presidency is that of a man “standing in 
the wings” . . . ready at all times to take the burden.  He must know the job 
of the President.  He must keep current on all national and international 
developments.  He must, in fact, be something of an “assistant 
President” . . . .32 
As to his proposal, Bayh stated: 
By leaving the nomination of the new Vice President up to the President 
himself, and the approval of that nomination up to the representatives of 
the people in Congress, my amendment provides for a means of selection 
very similar to the one which now prevails in our nomination and election 
process.33 
He further explained: 
There can be no question that when our two great parties meet in 
convention, the presidential nomination having been made, the presidential 
nominee of each party has a great voice in determining who his running 
mate for Vice President shall be.  In addition, it is imperative that the 
President should have as his Vice President one with whom he can work 
and who can assist him in carrying the burdens of the Presidency.34 
Bayh also asserted that his proposal had the additional advantage of 
“provid[ing] for continuity in the office of President of the same party during 
any 4-year term.”35  “It is this refilling of the office of Vice President,” Bayh 
said, “which is the key provision in the proposal.”36 
Section 3, he said, contained a “mechanism for the assumption” of the 
presidency by the vice president as acting president during a presidential 
inability.37  This section, he noted, dealt “with the situation where the 
President is able and willing to declare his own inability in writing.”38  
Section 4, he said, provided “for the situation where the President is either 
unwilling or unable to make such declaration.”39  In section 5 of his proposal, 
a modified version of which is now in section 4, he said that there was a 
mechanism “whereby a President can resume his office after recovery from 
a disability.”40  That provision, later to be changed, allowed the vice president 
to remain as acting president only with the written approval of a majority of 
the cabinet and concurring votes of two-thirds of the members present in both 
chambers of Congress.41 
 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. See id. 
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Upon laying the groundwork for his proposal, Senator Bayh remained 
open to suggestions from his colleagues and others, including the American 
legal community. 
B.  September 28 and 29, 1964 
In the Senate discussions of September 1964, Senator Bayh recounted 
what he had said earlier about the history of presidential succession, the 
deaths in office of presidents and vice presidents, and the inabilities suffered 
by Presidents James Garfield, Woodrow Wilson, and Dwight D. 
Eisenhower.42  He was expansive in his praise of others for reaching a 
moment in time when a proposed amendment on the dual subjects of 
presidential inability and vice presidential vacancy would be approved for 
the first time in the country’s history.43 
Addressing the informal protocol worked out by President Eisenhower and 
Vice President Richard Nixon for dealing with a presidential inability, 
Senator Bayh said: 
I compliment both those gentlemen for taking the initiative.  It was the 
first time that anything concrete had been proposed in this area.  But such 
informal agreements are unsatisfactory as permanent solutions.  Both Mr. 
Eisenhower and Mr. Nixon were among the first to say so.  Such 
agreements depend on good will between the President and Vice President.  
They do not have the force of law.  They could be subjected to serious 
constitutional challenge.  They open the door for possible usurpation of 
power from the President.44 
Concerning the role played by the Senate Majority Leader Michael 
Mansfield in helping secure the Senate’s approval of the amendment, Senator 
Bayh said: 
Mr. President, if I may take one final moment I would like the Senate to 
know that none of this could have taken place without the continuing 
interest and assistance of the distinguished majority leader.  During the last 
2 historic years, when the Congress has been faced with a multitude of 
pressing, often delicate, problems, and has been confronted with a number 
of delays, the distinguished Senator from Montana [Mr. Mansfield] has 
never lost sight of the significance of this issue now before us.  Now, when 
all of us are anxious to complete our business, he has, nonetheless, seen to 
it that we take the time to debate and act on this issue . . . .  It is just one 
more example of his statesmanship and devotion to the good and welfare 
of our Nation above all other considerations.45 
As to the involvement of the American Bar Association, he said: 
Today, I am happy to report there is a vast grassroots feeling of urgency.  
I should like to give particular credit to the American Bar Association 
 
 42. 110 CONG. REC. 22,950, 22,983–86 (1964). 
 43. See id. at 22,950, 22,987. 
 44. Id. at 22,987.  For a discussion of these protocols, see FEERICK, supra note 2, at 53–
54; see also FEERICK, supra note 10, at 211–29. 
 45. 110 CONG. REC. 23,001 (alteration in original). 
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which has done more than any single group to help us arrive at this 
consensus.  I present this consensus today on behalf of the Subcommittee 
on Constitutional Amendments and on behalf of the Committee on the 
Judiciary. 
Early this year, the American Bar Association conducted a 2-day 
meeting—a forum of the leading constitutional lawyers and scholars in the 
Nation—to which members of the subcommittee were invited.  Those at 
the meeting had as many different ideas as there were people present.  At 
least 14 or 15 different ideas were propounded. 
At the meeting, each one present entered into reasonable give-and-take 
in the hope that we could finally come forth with a proposal that might not 
be perfect nor totally acceptable to any one of us, yet nevertheless a 
workable plan which could be enacted by the Congress and approved by 
the several States.46 
In concluding his remarks, Bayh turned to Senators John Cooper and John 
Stennis, who wanted a roll call vote, and said: 
I thank the Senator from Kentucky and the Senator from Mississippi for 
lending their voices in support of this particular piece of legislation.  They 
are extremely able attorneys.  As a freshman Member of the Senate, it is 
very comforting and rewarding to me to have their support.  I particularly 
thank the Senator for cosponsoring this measure.  Putting the name 
“COOPER” on this legislation is like putting the name “sterling” on silver.  I 
appreciate it very much.47 
Replying to Senator Sam J. Ervin of North Carolina, who said the proposed 
amendment would be “saying ‘amen’ in the year 1964 to what John Tyler”48 
said in 1841, Bayh asserted:  “Let this Senator say ‘amen’ to what the Senator 
from North Carolina has said . . . .  I believe that by requiring cooperation by 
all branches of the Government, we shall arrive at the right answer.”49 
C.  The Debates of February 19, 1965 
While a conference committee in June 1965 would make final changes to 
the proposed amendment, the Senate debates of February 19, 1965, which 
resulted in a favorable vote of 72 to 0, set the tone for the success that 
followed.50  In these debates, Senator Bayh dealt with alternative proposals 
by colleagues and, in the process, made as clear as could be what was 
intended conceptually by the amendment.51  Some salient remarks by him 
are illustrative.  Of a constitutional amendment and not a congressional 
statute, he observed that 
certain guarantees of Presidential action could be provided.  For example, 
a two-thirds vote is required by Congress before the President can be 
removed.  But if it were left to Congress to specify by law what formula 
 
 46. Id. at 22,983 (statement of Sen. Birch Bayh). 
 47. Id. at 23,058. 
 48. Id. at 22,989 (statement of Sen. Sam J. Ervin). 
 49. Id. (statement of Sen. Birch Bayh). 
 50. See FEERICK, supra note 2, at 87–91. 
 51. See 111 CONG. REC. 3250–86 (1965). 
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should be followed, that could best be done by a majority vote.  I believe 
that that would afford insufficient protection for the President.52 
In addressing why there was a need for an amendment with details, he said 
that “[s]tate legislative bodies would prefer to . . . deal with a specific 
proposal and not give Congress a blank check to take away the safeguards” 
of the amendment.53  He commented that the “horrible tragedy in Dallas, 
Tex., would have been much worse . . . if we had not had a definite procedure 
which was accepted by the people of America so that Lyndon Johnson could 
assume the office of President . . . from that of Vice President.”54 
Of the approach in section 2 for filling a vacancy in the vice presidency, 
he said: 
It was the opinion of the subcommittee, plus that of the American Bar 
Association in their consensus group, and the full Committee on the 
Judiciary, that by combining both presidential and congressional action, we 
were doing two things.  We were guaranteeing that the President would 
have a man with whom he could work.  We were also guaranteeing to the 
people their right to make that decision.55 
When opposing time limits in section 2, he said:  “There is a President who 
is able to conduct business and to carry on the affairs of our country.  I should 
dislike to see everything that must be decided by Congress come to a stop in 
the event Congress becomes logjammed on this question.”56 
As to the possibility of a Congress not of the president’s party delaying a 
vote on a vice presidential nomination to keep the Speaker in place as next 
in the line of succession, Bayh said:  “I have more faith in the Congress acting 
in an emergency in the white heat of publicity, with the American people 
looking on.  The last thing Congress would dare to do would be to become 
involved in a purely political move.”57 
As to the term “inability,” he said: 
[T]he word “inability” and the word “unable,” as used in [section 4] . . . 
refer to an impairment of the President’s faculties, mean that he is unable 
to either make or communicate his decisions as to his own competency to 
execute the powers and duties of his office.  I should like for the RECORD 
to include that as my definition of the words “inability” and “unable.”58 
As to the combination of the vice president and cabinet having the power 
to declare a president disabled, Bayh endorsed a statement by Senator Hiram 
Fong of Hawaii, Bayh’s colleague on the Senate subcommittee.  Fong 
explained:  “It is reasonable to assume that persons the President selects as 
Cabinet officers are the President’s most devoted and loyal supporters who 
 
 52. Id. at 3254. 
 53. Id. at 3271. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 3255. 
 56. Id. at 3277. 
 57. Id. at 3275. 
 58. Id. at 3282. 
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would naturally wish his continuance as President.”59  Responding 
immediately after Fong finished his remarks on the Senate floor, Bayh said: 
I compliment the Senator from Hawaii . . . on his well-defined statement, 
in which he covered all the principal points, and in which he stressed the 
need for the Senate to join behind the consensus of the experts, feeling that 
we have the best proposal before the Senate now, and that if we spend more 
time searching for that which is perfect it will become a search for the 
impossible.60 
Regarding the need to resolve quickly the issue of presidential inability, 
Bayh said, “[W]e are questioning the disability of the President, the man who 
has his ‘finger on the button.’  This issue needs to be decided immediately.”61 
As to why the vice president remained the acting president during the 
period in which Congress had to decide a disagreement over presidential 
inability, he said: 
[W]e desired to try to prevent a back-and-forth ping-pong sort of situation 
in which the Vice President and the Cabinet would make a declaration.  The 
President might be out and the Vice President would be in.  Then the issue 
would go to Congress and Congress might make a declaration that the Vice 
President should be out and the President in.  Under the proposal there 
would be fewer transfers of power and more continuity, which I feel should 
be basic.62 
As for the waiting period for resuming the powers and duties of president, 
Bayh also said that the vice president would be the acting president during 
this time because 
there would be a serious enough doubt about the mental capacity—and 
usually it would be the mental capacity of the President—that the decision 
[by the vice president and cabinet] would be made, [so] the Vice President 
would assume the powers and duties as Acting President while the decision 
was being made by Congress.63 
As to the waiting period, he noted that “[t]he provision would not prevent the 
Vice President and the President agreeing to a lesser period of time.”64 
II.  SENATOR BIRCH BAYH ADDRESSES THE HOUSE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE 
In February 1965, Senator Bayh was invited to testify before the House 
Judiciary Committee to answer questions from its members about S.J. Res. 
1.65  He responded to a great many such questions, including questions in the 
 
 59. Id. at 3262. 
 60. Id. at 3263. 
 61. Id. at 3281. 
 62. Id. at 3284. 
 63. Id. at 3285. 
 64. Id. 
 65. See Presidential Inability:  Hearings on H.R. 836 et al. Before the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 89th Cong. 39 (1965) [hereinafter 1965 House Hearings] (statement of Sen. Birch 
Bayh). 
40 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89 
form of hypotheticals concerning possible workings of the amendment.66  
Some examples follow. 
In responding to questions concerning a president’s choice of vice 
president under section 2, he observed that 
if we weren’t careful we were going to proliferate further the executive 
branch and try to set up someone who would be competing with the 
President unless we gave the President primary responsibility of picking 
the man with whom he could work.  If the person is a namby-pamby person, 
the Congress wouldn’t go along.  He would have to send another name. 
. . . . 
. . . The most important thing is getting not only a man who is well 
qualified, but getting a man who was not a political hack.  The man would 
have to be well qualified, but he should be one with whom the President 
could work.67 
Bayh also commented: 
If I may ask you to think with me on the recent tragedy in Dallas where 
Lyndon Johnson was suddenly elevated to the office of President, and the 
whole world was in mourning.  The last thing that the electorate of the 
country would have tolerated would have been the selection of a Vice 
President who was not extremely qualified for the job.68 
Of the use of the word “confirmation” in section 2, Bayh replied: 
It is our feeling that certainly the Members of Congress would not want the 
Vice President to assume the powers and duties of the office of Vice 
President in the absence of some advice and consent . . . .  So we felt the 
word “confirmation” in this case was better than the use of the words 
“advise and consent” because of the implications that might be involved by 
past precedent.69 
Discussing the meaning of “vacancy” in section 2, he agreed with 
Congressman Richard Poff that it refers “to those cases where the President 
or Vice President is no longer occupying the office by reason of death, 
resignation, or removal.”70  Senator Bayh observed that there was “ample 
precedent to indicate that this is the preponderance of legal thought on the 
question.”71 
On whether a vice president under section 2 could nominate someone 
under the age of thirty-five, Bayh said:  “I would think not.  I would think, 
certainly, that just the adding of an amendment to the Constitution does not 
repeal previous requirements that have been put on this office . . . .”72  He 
also said that there was no intention whatsoever to do so, observing that “[i]n 
 
 66. See id. at 91 (statement of Sen. Birch Bayh). 
 67. See id. (statement of Sen. Birch Bayh). 
 68. See id. (statement of Sen. Birch Bayh). 
 69. Id. at 45 (statement of Sen. Birch Bayh).  For instance, the term “advice and consent” 
has certain implications with regard to recess appointments.  
 70. Id. at 87 (statement of Rep. Richard H. Poff, Member, H. Comm. on the Judiciary). 
 71. Id. (statement of Sen. Birch Bayh).  
 72. Id. at 48 (statement of Sen. Birch Bayh). 
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fact the 12th amendment setting up new electoral procedure does not carry 
over all the qualifications of the President in the 12th amendment.”73 
On the disability provisions of the amendment and whether the vice 
president takes the presidential oath on becoming an acting president, Bayh 
said that 
the oath of office as Vice President gets him into the position where he, 
under this constitutional amendment, would assume the powers and duties 
as Acting President, not as President.  It would therefore be unnecessary 
for him, with this provision, to take the Presidential oath. 
. . . . 
. . . We are not giving [him] the office but we are simply giving him the 
powers and duties of the office, which would be sufficient.74 
As to whether the amendment would change the line of succession as 
enacted by Congress, Bayh said: 
I think the whole disability question can be greatly simplified, although not 
completely simplified by again looking at reality. 
Let us say the President has a serious operation.  He declares his own 
disability.  There is no problem. 
Say the President has a heart attack.  He is in an oxygen tent and the 
Russians move missiles into Cuba.  The Vice President gets together with 
the Cabinet and says something has to be done to protect the interests of 
the country.  No problem. 
These two examples would be 90 percent of the disability occurrences.75 
As for the remaining 10 percent, Bayh added: 
I think that you have sufficient protection against usurpation of power by 
providing that the Vice President, the majority of the Cabinet, and two-
thirds of the Members of Congress must agree the President is disabled. 
There isn’t any way to make this seem as if it wouldn’t be a tangled mess 
in the press or any place else. 
. . . . 
. . . May I suggest that the damage to the President as an individual is 
not so important as the safety of the country. 
. . . . 
. . . If Congress finds that the Cabinet cannot adequately fill this role, 
then it provides an alternative body which will function. This is the way we 
intended it.76 
Of a President who is found disabled at the end of the congressional 
process, Bayh said: 
It is my impression or intent that he would have more than one chance but, 
having utilized the one chance, I think he would be very careful in making 
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a second appeal to the Congress because the degree of frequency with 
which he appealed to the Congress would certainly reflect the attitude with 
which Congress would look on his mental capacity.77 
Senator Bayh opined that an agreement by the president and vice president 
“would cover a great majority of the cases.”78 
On the reason for having written declarations of “inability,” Bayh said: 
It was the feeling of the committee—and our report so states—that 
transmittal to the offices of the presiding officers of each House shall be 
sufficient constructive notice for the transferral of power, and that the time 
lapse involved in transmitting this notice from 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue 
to Capitol Hill is sufficiently short that it would not be something to 
concern ourselves with and would guarantee public notice for the entire 
country.79 
And, he added: 
The committee was sufficiently concerned about the Vice President coming 
up with a letter in his pocket or finding it in his dresser drawer or something, 
that we changed the wording of the section . . . to read that a letter from the 
President must be transmitted in the normal course of business as all 
Executive messages are transmitted to the presiding officers of both 
Houses.80 
In a situation under section 4 (then section 5), wherein the president 
declares he is able, Bayh said: 
The Vice President continues to act as President until the Congress decides 
the issue. 
. . . . 
. . . Then the burden is on the Vice President and the majority of the 
Cabinet.  It is on their shoulders to get two-thirds of the Congress to support 
their contention that the President is unable to perform the powers and 
duties of the office.81 
As to the expression “principal officers of the executive departments,”82 
Bayh said:  “The logical interpretation is that the heads of the executive 
departments are the principal officers of the executive departments.  This is 
the Cabinet.”83  He further contended that “[t]his has been the general 
interpretation put on this language . . . .  [W]e made our intent abundantly 
clear in our report.”84 
As to a vice president acting as president who then becomes disabled, Bayh 
said, “[w]e have not provided for this contingency,”85 and explained “the 
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reason we did not include it was that the more complicated you make a 
constitutional amendment . . . the more contingencies for which you provide, 
the more difficult it is to get it passed.”86 
In explaining the insertion of the word “discharge” before “powers and 
duties” in the inability sections, Bayh said that “[t]he goal is to provide that 
if we ever do get in this position—God forbid, but we may—the Vice 
President should not only have the powers and duties but should discharge 
them.”87 
As to a member of Congress not voting if presented with a case of 
presidential inability, Bayh said: 
I think that we have to realize when we vote as Members of Congress or 
take action that we consider what the final result of our actions is going to 
be. 
To feel in my mind that the President was incapable of fulfilling the 
powers and duties of his office, and sit silently by and do nothing to prevent 
him from resuming the powers and duties at the end of 10 days would 
constitute gross negligence.  By inaction you are, in effect, acting, are you 
not?88 
As to the subject of the vice president and cabinet raising the question of 
an inability, Bayh said: 
We had considerable discussion.  In fact, one small change that we made 
in the final committee bill . . . was to give joint responsibility to the Cabinet 
and Vice President to act under section 4.  We have another possibility; 
namely, not only that the President does not declare himself, but the Vice 
President does not so declare, nor does the Cabinet initiate. 
. . . . 
. . . But either may take the initiative. 
. . . . 
. . . [I]t does not say “the Vice President with the concurrence.” 
. . . . 
. . . Either one can pose the question and the other one can concur 
therein.89 
Explaining why the cabinet must be involved in these decisions, Bayh stated: 
There was no precedent or constitutional provision such as we are trying to 
provide.  We put the Cabinet in there because we feel this is the group 
which is best able to protect the President from a power-hungry Vice 
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President and the group which is most intimately associated with his 
official status.  It is a thorny problem.90 
Of the precedents, he said: 
Wilson . . . is a good example of one of the most complicated problems 
which might arise under this and Marshall did not act.  But history shows 
us that there was a great deal of concern about the Tyler precedent—that if 
he did act, would he then, in the event Wilson then recuperated, not be 
President and Wilson out in the cold? 
We are making it easier for the Vice President to assume presidential 
duties.  We should put in the amendment the provisions under which he 
may act and not make it look as if he is power hungry.91 
In the course of his testimony that day before the House Judiciary 
Committee, Bayh said: 
In no way are we attempting to say that as far as I am concerned, and I 
think so far as our committee is concerned, that this is it and this is the end.  
I think this committee should . . . give it the most careful consideration and 
scrutiny and so far as the junior Senator from Indiana is concerned, any 
questions you have to ask now, later, or any time on which I may be helpful, 
I am ready and willing to answer them because this is a matter of great 
concern and it shouldn’t be entered into carelessly.92 
After the House of Representatives acted on the recommendations of the 
Judiciary Committee in April 1965, a conference committee was needed to 
resolve the language differences between the two chambers of Congress. 
III.  CHANGES BY THE CONFERENCE COMMITTEE 
A.  The Conference Committee Report 
Senator Bayh presented the report of the conference committee to the 
Senate on June 30, 1965, stating: 
In the Senate version of the measure we prescribed that all declarations 
concerning the inability of a President or of his ability to perform the 
powers and duties of that office . . . be transmitted to the Speaker of the 
House and to the President of the Senate. 
The conference committee report proposes that those declarations go to 
the Speaker and the President pro tempore of the Senate.  The reason for 
the change is, of course, that the Vice President, who is also the President 
of the Senate, would be participating in making a declaration of presidential 
inability [under Section 4], and therefore would be unable to transmit his 
own declaration to himself.93 
Addressing section 3, he said: 
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In the Senate version . . . we did not specify that if the President were to 
surrender his powers and duties voluntarily . . . he could resume them 
immediately upon declaring that his inability no longer existed. 
. . . . 
We added specific language enabling the President to resume his powers 
and duties immediately, with no waiting period, if he had given up his 
powers and duties by voluntary declaration.94 
Of another change in section 4, Senator Bayh said: 
In the Senate version we prescribed that the President . . . could resume 
the powers and duties of the office of President . . . unless within 7 days the 
Vice President and a majority of the Cabinet or the other body issued a 
declaration challenging the President’s intention [to resume the powers and 
duties of his office].  The House version prescribed that the waiting period 
be 2 days.  The conference compromised on 4 days, and I urge the Senate 
to accept that as a reasonable compromise between the time limits imposed 
by the two bodies. 
Furthermore, we have clarified language, at the request of the Senate 
conferees, to make crystal clear that the Vice President must be a party to 
any action declaring the President unable to perform his powers and 
duties.95 
Of another change, he said: 
The Senate conferees accepted a House amendment requiring the 
Congress to convene within 48 hours, if they were not then in session, and 
if the Vice President and a majority of the Cabinet or other body were to 
challenge the President’s declaration that he, the Chief Executive, were not 
disabled or, once again, able to perform the powers and duties of his office. 
We feel that the requirement would encourage speedy disposition of the 
question by the Congress, and I urge its acceptance by the Senate.96 
Finally, he said: 
[T]he Senate version imposed longtime limitations upon the Congress to 
settle a dispute as to whether the President or the Vice President could 
perform the powers and duties of the office of President.  Senators know 
the question would come to the Congress only if the Vice President, who 
would then be acting as President, were to challenge, in conjunction with a 
majority of the Cabinet, the President’s declaration that no inability existed.  
The House version imposed a 10-day time limitation.  The Senate conferees 
were willing to have a time limitation as a further safeguard to the 
President, but we were unanimous that 10 days was too short a period in 
which to decide on that grave a question. 
The conferees finally agreed to a 21-day time limitation after which, if 
the Vice President had failed to win the support of two-thirds of both the 
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Houses of Congress, the President would automatically return to the powers 
and duties of his office.97 
Senator Bayh then added that, “including a time limitation in the 
Constitution of the United States would impose upon those who come after 
us in this great body a limitation on their discussion and deliberation when 
surrounded by contingencies which we cannot foresee.”98  He further said 
that “if one House voted but failed to get the necessary two-thirds majority, 
the other House would be precluded from using the 21 days and the President 
would immediately reassume the powers and duties of his office.”99 
Following Senator Bayh’s presentation on June 30, several major subjects 
were raised for discussion in the Senate.  One involved the use of the cabinet 
in the process of declaring a president disabled.100  Another related to the 
meaning of “inability.”101  Still another subject involved the introduction of 
the word “either,” in the section 4 clause language, as follows:  (1) 
“[w]henever the Vice President and a majority of either the principal officers 
of the executive departments or of such other body as Congress may by law 
provide”102 and (2) “he shall resume the powers and duties of his office 
unless the Vice President and a majority of either the principal officers of the 
executive department or of such other body as Congress may by law 
provide.”103 
B.  The Use of the Cabinet 
Following Senator Bayh’s submission of the conference committee’s 
report on June 30, 1965, Senator Robert Kennedy of New York opened a 
discussion concerning the provision in section 4 that provided for Congress 
to create a “body” other than the cabinet for determining a president’s 
inability.104  He expressed reservations about the use of the cabinet, stating 
that some people questioned whether “there is some better way to handle this 
very difficult matter.”105  The subject, he said, was worthy of continuing 
reexamination, observing that “a President might fire his entire Cabinet.”106  
As to this issue, Senator Kennedy recounted the disability of President 
Wilson, observing that 
there was no evidence of any overt attempt to usurp the powers of the 
President, [yet] the ailing President nevertheless decided to dispose of any 
Cabinet member who seemed to present a threat.  More serious conflict 
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might follow, in a comparable situation, now that a procedure for 
determining disability is established.107 
He added: 
[T]he committee reports and other legislative history make it quite clear 
that . . . the Deputies or Under Secretaries . . . would, when there clearly 
are vacancies in the Cabinet, become acting heads of the departments until 
new principal officers were confirmed, or, if Congress were not in session, 
until recess appointments were made.108 
In times of crisis, Senator Kennedy acknowledged, a dispute involving the 
firing of a cabinet would be difficult and disruptive, complicating the 
question of who is acting as president.109  He therefore favored a continued 
examination of an alternative procedure after the amendment was adopted.110  
Debate ensued on the House’s version of this provision in section 4, with a 
particular focus on that feature. 
C.  The Term “Inability” 
Following his exchange with Senator Bayh on the role of the cabinet, 
Senator Kennedy said he wished to clarify another important issue involving 
the scope of the “inability” provision of the amendment.  This exchange 
followed: 
Is it not true that the inability to which we are referring in the proposed 
amendment is total inability to exercise the powers and duties of the office? 
Mr. BAYH:  The inability that we deal with here is described several 
times in the amendment itself as the inability of the President to perform 
the powers and duties of his office. 
It is conceivable that a President might be able to walk, for example, and 
thus, by the definition of some people, might be physically able, but at the 
same time he might not possess the mental capacity to make a decision and 
perform the powers and duties of his office.  We are talking about inability 
to perform the constitutional duties of the office of President. 
Mr. KENNEDY of New York:  And that has to be total disability to 
perform the powers and duties of office. 
Mr. BAYH:  The Senator is correct.  We are not getting into a position, 
through the pending measure, in which, when a President makes an 
unpopular decision, he would immediately be rendered unable to perform 
the duties of his office. 
Mr. KENNEDY of New York:  Is it limited to mental inability to make or 
communicate his decision regarding his capacity and mental inability to 
perform the powers and duties prescribed by law? 
Mr. BAYH:  I do not believe that we should limit it to mental disability.  
It is conceivable that the President might fall into the hands of the enemy, 
for example. 
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Mr. KENNEDY of New York:  It involves physical or mental inability to 
make or communicate his decision regarding his capacity and physical or 
mental inability to exercise the powers and duties of his office. 
Mr. BAYH:  The Senator is correct.  That is very important.  I would refer 
the Senator back to the definition which I read into the RECORD at the time 
the Senate passed this measure earlier this year. 
Mr. KENNEDY of New York:  It was that definition which I was seeking 
to reemphasize.  May I ask one other question?  Is it not true that the 
inability referred to must be expected to be of long duration, or at least one 
whose duration is uncertain and might persist? 
Mr. BAYH:  Here again I think one of the advantages of this particular 
amendment is the leeway it gives us.  We are not talking about the kind of 
inability in which the President went to the dentist and was under 
anesthesia.  It is not that type of inability we are talking about, but the 
Cabinet, as well as the Vice President and Congress, are going to have to 
judge the severity of the disability and the problems that face our country. 
. . . . 
Mr. KENNEDY of New York:  Is it not true that what we are talking about 
here, as far as inability is concerned, is not a brief or temporary inability? 
Mr. BAYH:  We are talking about one that would seriously impair the 
President’s ability to perform the powers and duties of his office. 
Mr. KENNEDY of New York:  Could a President have such inability for 
a short period of time? 
Mr. BAYH:  A President who was unconscious for 30 minutes when 
missiles were flying toward this country might only be disabled 
temporarily, but it would be of severe consequence when viewed in the 
light of the problems facing the country. 
So at that time, even for that short duration, someone would have to 
make a decision.  But a disability which has persisted for only a short time 
would ordinarily be excluded.  If a President were unable to make an 
Executive decision which might have severe consequences for the country, 
I think we would be better off under the conditions of the amendment. 
Mr. KENNEDY of New York:  The Senator realizes the complications for 
the people of this country and the world under those circumstances. 
Mr. BAYH:  I do, indeed.  I also recognize our difficulty if we had no 
amendment at all.111 
D.  The Word “Either” 
Senator Albert Gore of Tennessee and others saw the addition of “either” 
as a consequential change of language,112 designed to make certain that the 
“Vice President would participate in the declaration of disability with a body 
created by law if such were done.”113  Gore said that a vice president would 
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be in a position to “shop around” for support of his position that the president 
was unable to discharge the powers of his office.114 
Addressing the argument that the language permitted two coequal bodies 
to function concurrently, Senator Bayh said: 
I invite the attention of Senators to the definition of [“either/ or”] in Black’s 
Legal Dictionary and to most legal cases on the point—that when we talk 
about “either/or” it is interpreted in the disjunctive.  It does not refer to two, 
but to either one or the other. 
. . . . 
. . . Certainly it is the intention of the conference committee and it is my 
contention, as the floor manager of the joint resolution and as the principal 
sponsor of it . . . to have the Vice President and a majority of the Cabinet 
make the decision, unless Congress, in its wisdom, at some later time, 
determines by statute to establish some other body to act with the Vice 
President.115 
He also expressed his view in the debate that, assuming any ambiguity in 
the use of “either/or,” a court would look to the legislative history.116  
Moreover, he observed that Congress, were it to invoke the enabling 
provision to create another body, would specify that it was replacing the 
cabinet as acting in concert with the vice president.117 
D.  Concluding Remarks on July 6, 1965 
Senator Bayh concluded his remarks by saying “I think we have to 
determine one question:  Is the conference report the best piece of proposed 
legislation we can get and is it needed?  As loudly as I can, I say that we must 
answer the question in the affirmative.”118  Senator Russell Long of 
Louisiana, supportive of Bayh, added that he might have preferred some 
changes be made, but the advice he received was “[p]lease don’t muddy the 
water.”119  “If we start all over again,” Long said, “other Senators will also 
have suggestions to make, and we shall be another 100 years getting to the 
point which we now have reached.”120  Senator Ervin, strongly supportive of 
S.J. Res. 1 and the conference report, added: 
When we started to consider the proposal . . . .  [w]e were concerned with 
the old adage that too many cooks would spoil the broth.  We had more 
cooks with more zeal concerned with preparing this “broth” than any piece 
of proposed legislation I have ever seen in the time I have been in the 
Senate.  If it had not been for the perseverance, the patience, and the 
willingness to compromise which was manifested on a multitude of 
occasions by the junior Senator from Indiana, we would never have gotten 
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the resolution out of the subcommittee, much less through the full Judiciary 
Committee and then through the conference with the House.  I am of the 
opinion that the conference report which the Senator from Indiana is 
seeking to have approved would submit to the States the very best possible 
resolution on the subject obtainable in the Congress of the United States as 
it is now constituted.  The Senator from Indiana deserves the thanks of the 
American people for the fact that he was willing to change the ingredients 
of the broth in order to appease a multitude of different cooks who had 
different recipes for it, including myself.121 
The question was called and the proposed amendment was approved, 68 to 
5, by two-thirds of the senators present and voting on July 6.122 
CONCLUSION 
In the preface to Senator Bayh’s book, One Heartbeat Away:  Presidential 
Disability and Succession, Dwight D. Eisenhower’s concluding words were:  
“To Senator Bayh and to all others whose persevering efforts are described 
in this book, I extend a hearty commendation for a task well performed.”123  
In his concluding words of that book, Senator Bayh said: 
In 1787, John Dick[i]nson of Delaware, a delegate to the Constitutional 
Convention meeting in Philadelphia, had asked, “What is meant by the term 
disability and who shall be the judge of it?”  On February 23, 1966, at 1:18 
P.M., 179 years later, in the East Room of the White House, John 
Dick[i]nson received his answer.124 
And let me conclude with the words of Senate Majority Leader Mansfield 
of Montana on the occasion of the very first vote of approval of the 
amendment on September 28, 1964: 
I believe this is a momentous and historic occasion.  I am delighted that 
so many of our colleagues on both sides of the aisle have joined with the 
distinguished junior Senator from Indiana, and, under his leadership, I am 
delighted that the proposed joint resolution is now on the verge of passage.  
It is a foundation which will set well in the building which is this 
Republic.125 
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